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Kennedy v. Bremerton School District:
A Fumble the Supreme Court Needs to
Recover.
EMILY C. NEELY1
“People who work together will win, whether it be against complex
football defenses, or the problems of modern society.”
-Vince Lombardi (1913-1970)
Many people support one or the other: freedom of religion or freedom
from religion. Current Supreme Court case law favors the protection of
students’ rights under the Establishment Clause. However, First Amendment free speech rights for public officials do not enjoy the same protection. Previous notes seek to affirm the constitutionality of restricting the
speech of public officials in deference to the Establishment Clause. This
Note differs from those, however, by acknowledging the prominent role that
the Establishment Clause plays in protecting student rights, but also advocating for greater First Amendment protection for public officials.

1. Third-year law student at Northern Illinois University. Lord, may I boast only in
Christ’s death and resurrection.
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INTRODUCTION
Football is an American pastime that some people might call a religious experience. A congregation gathers together to worship God.2 Fans
gather together each week in reverence for their team. Believers in Christ
clothe themselves with the full armor of God to enable them to pursue holiness.3 Players put on armor to help them as they pursue victory. After a
2. “And let us consider how to stir up one another to love and good works, not
neglecting to meet together, as is the habit of some, but encouraging one another, and all the
more as you see the Day drawing near.” Hebrews 10:24-25;
For by the grace given to me I say to everyone among you not
to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to
think with sober judgment, each according to the measure of
faith that God has assigned. For as in one body we have many
members, and the members do not all have the same function,
so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and individually
members one of another.
Romans 12:3-5.
3.
Finally, be strong in the Lord and in the strength of his might.
Put on the whole armor of God, that you may be able to stand
against the schemes of the devil. For we do not wrestle against
flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities,
against the cosmic powers over this present darkness, against
the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places. Therefore
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game, a coach might walk onto the field of play, perhaps to the fifty-yard
line, to take a knee and give thanks to God for the courage and fortitude of
each team. But if he coaches at a public school in the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, he must learn to jettison his Christian faith.
In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, a recent ruling by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that a high school football coach
speaks as a public employee and not a private citizen when he prays on the
fifty-yard line immediately after games.4 Prayer in public schools under the
guise of the authority of the State is typically held unconstitutional,5 however, as a practical matter, this specific holding allows for a restriction on a
public employee’s First Amendment right to free speech.6 This Note will
analyze the current Supreme Court case law that governs the issue of prayer
by public employees.7 This Note will demonstrate that current Supreme
Court case law favors the ruling set out by the Ninth Circuit. It provides an
analysis as to why public employees should be afforded more First
Amendment protection than is currently provided by the Supreme Court.8 It
offers a solution to this problem by outlining a balancing test that the Supreme Court should use to analyze this issue.9
I. OVERVIEW OF KENNEDY V. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT
In order to further understand the court’s justification for its holding in
Kennedy, it is imperative to review the facts of the case. Joseph Kennedy
was the head coach of the junior varsity football team and an assistant
coach of the varsity team at Bremerton High School (BHS) in the state of
Washington from 2008 to 2015.10 Kennedy is a Christian and his religious
convictions compel him to thank God for his players’ accomplishments on
the football field at the end of each game.11 He says that he feels like God is
calling him to “take a knee at the [fifty]-yard line and offer a brief, quiet
prayer of thanksgiving for player safety, sportsmanship, and spirited com-

take up the whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand firm.
Ephesians 6:10-13.
4. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
5. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
6. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
7. See discussion infra Section II.
8. See discussion infra Section IV.
9. See discussion infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
10. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 815.
11. Id. at 816.
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petition.”12 Kennedy started praying on the field immediately following
football games when he first began coaching at Bremerton High School.13
Initially, he prayed alone, but then players began to join him, and eventually the majority of the team would join Kennedy in prayer.14 Kennedy’s
prayers would typically last for about thirty seconds.15
Officials in the Bremerton School District (BSD) took issue with Kennedy’s conduct.16 They were concerned that his actions violated the Establishment Clause.17 The School District told Kennedy that staff may not take
action that a reasonable observer would perceive to be an endorsement of
religious activity.18 After several attempts by the Bremerton School District
to prevent Kennedy from engaging in demonstrative religious activity, the
School District placed him on paid administrative leave.19 However, the
Bremerton School District Superintendent did acknowledge that Kennedy’s
practices were “well-intentioned and that Kennedy had ‘not actively encouraged, or required, [student] participation.’”20 It was Kennedy’s view
that,
[d]espite [his] full “compli[ance]” with BSD’s “directives
not to intentionally involve students in his on-duty religious
activities,” BSD changed the rules. Instead of abiding by its
written policies – and its prior instructions to Coach Kennedy – BSD issued a sweeping new directive that prohibited on-duty BHS employees from engaging in any “demonstrative religious activity” that is “readily observable to …
students and the attending public.”21
Kennedy filed suit on August 9, 2016.22 He sought to enjoin the School
District from discriminating against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. He also alleged that he had been retaliated against for practicing his religious beliefs, which resulted in his removal as football coach.23

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 816.
16. Id. at 817.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 817.
21. Brief of Appellant at 1-2, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813
(2017) (No. 16-35801), 2016 WL 6611220, at *1-2.
22. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 820.
23. Id. at 821.

42

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.11-1

The Ninth Circuit analyzed Kennedy’s retaliation claim under a fivestep test outlined in Eng v. Cooley.24 The Eng test requires that a party seeking relief on a retaliation claim must show that he spoke on a matter of public concern, that he spoke as a private citizen and not a public employee,
and that the speech at issue was a substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse employment action.25 Once a party makes that showing, the burden
is on the State to show that it had adequate justification for discharging the
employee or that it would have taken the same action even without the protected speech.26
The court determined that the speech was indeed a matter of public
concern, that the speech at issue was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action, and that the State would have not taken the same adverse
employment action absent the protected speech.27 Therefore, the court only
considered whether Kennedy spoke as a public employee and not whether
Bremerton School District’s actions were adequately justified.28
The court found that Kennedy was indeed acting as a public employee,
so they did not analyze the justification of the School District’s actions.29
The court found that he was acting as a public employee for two reasons. 30
First, the religious activity took place immediately following games and
while in view of students and parents.31 Second, the religious activity was
not in the ordinary scope of his duties as an assistant football coach.32 The
court found that Kennedy’s job description was “to be a coach, mentor and
role model for the student athletes” and that his role was similar to the role
of a teacher.33 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court
24.
25.
26.
27.

Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 1071.

Here, the parties do not contest that Kennedy spoke on a matter of public concern (Eng factor one), that the relevant speech
was a substantial or motivating factor in the District’s decision
to place Kennedy on leave (Eng factor three), and that the District would not have taken the adverse employment action in
the absence of the relevant speech (Eng factor five). Thus, we
need [to] consider only whether Kennedy spoke as a private
citizen or a public employee (Eng factor two), and whether
BSD’s conduct was adequately justified by its need to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation (Eng factor four).
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2017).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 825.
31. Id.
32. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
33. Id. at 815.
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finding Kennedy was acting as a public employee when he prayed on the
fifty-yard line immediately following games, thereby denying his injunctive
request for relief.34
II. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CASE LAW REGARDING
PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A landmark 1962 Supreme Court case involving prayer in public
schools is Engel v. Vitale.35 In Engel, a New York school district implemented a policy that required students to recite a specific prayer at the beginning of each school day.36 This policy was implemented after New York
instituted a state prayer program, which directed a school district’s principal
to cause the prayer to be recited.37 A group of parents challenged the constitutionality of the policy on the basis that it violated the Establishment
Clause.38 The Court in Engel held that it is a violation of the separation of
church and state to allow a public-school system to implement a policy requiring students to recite a prayer.39 They found that “each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.”40
In Engel, the Court opined about the ability of the State to coerce individuals to observe certain religious practices.41 The State argued that the
statute did not violate the Establishment Clause because the prayer was
nondenominational and because it allowed students to remain silent or leave
the room while the prayer was being recited.42 The Court found that the
adoption of the state law that established the prayer be recited was enough
to violate the Establishment Clause, even though the laws did not directly
coerce individuals, because “[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain.”43

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 827.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 425.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 431.
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A little more than twenty years later, the Supreme Court heard a similar case, Wallace v. Jaffree.44 In Wallace, a group of parents challenged the
constitutionality of an Alabama state statute that authorized a one-minute
period of silence for all students in public school.45 The statute specifically
designated the time for “meditation or voluntary prayer.”46 The parents argued that the statute violated the Establishment Clause because it was a
means by which the State was trying to advance religion and because the
statute did not have a secular legislative purpose.47 The Court held that the
statute was a violation of the Establishment Clause because it was “not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion.”48
The Court referenced a three-part test in construing the Establishment
Clause: (1) whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose, (2) whether
its primary effect is one that advances or inhibits religion,49 and (3) whether
the statute fosters “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”50
Because the Court found that there was not a secular legislative purpose, it
did not inquire into the second and third criteria.51 In order to decide whether or not there was a secular legislative purpose for the enactment of the
statute, the Court asked “whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion.”52 Through Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court solidified the bright-line rule that if a state takes action with the intent to endorse
or disapprove of religion, the state violates the Establishment Clause.53 This
bright-line rule helped pave the way for the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.54
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether school officials are permitted to include prayers in invocation and benediction ceremonies.55 In Lee v. Weisman, a public-school student and her parent sought
an injunction to prevent her public school from including a prayer at her
graduation ceremony.56 The Court held that school officials are not allowed
to recruit clergy to offer prayers at a public-school graduation ceremony.57
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 60.
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 813 (2017).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 577.
Id.
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The Court found that allowing this behavior would be to allow the
school to coerce students to participate in religion.58 It found that since high
school students are impressionable and subject to societal pressure, they are
more susceptible to being coerced by their advisers.59 In finding the prayer
improper, the Court said, “the State has in every practical sense compelled
attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of
singular importance to every student, one the objecting student had no real
alternative to avoid.”60 In its analysis, the Court looked to the degree of the
school’s involvement in the graduation prayer in deciding that the State
violated the Establishment Clause.61
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Supreme Court
held that allowing a public school to authorize students to lead and participate in prayer over the intercom prior to football games was a violation of
the Establishment Clause.62 The Court found that this activity by the school
was impermissibly coercive and that prayer by the students in this way was
not considered private speech.63 At Santa Fe High School, it was the practice of the student council chaplain to direct a prayer over the school intercom before each home varsity football game.64 While the initial lawsuit
filed by students and their parents against the school was pending, the
school district implemented a different policy that allowed students to vote
in an election to determine whether the prayers at issue should be delivered
at the football games.65 The policy allowed a student to engage in “nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer” over the intercom before games.66
The Court found that the speech at issue was not private speech because although the prayers were delivered by students, the prayers were
given by a student who represented the student body at a school event on
school property.67 Further, the student was under the supervision of public
employee faculty members.68 The Court also found that this type of speech
is coercive because it requires students to choose between going to the
football games and avoiding the games so that they are not offended by the
religious activity of their peers.69 A reasonable student would likely expect
that they have the right to attend and enjoy a high school football game, as
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 578.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
Id.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 294.
Id.
Id.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290.
Id.
Id.
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that experience is a social convention rooted in tradition. For this reason,
the Court found that students’ rights under the Establishment Clause should
be protected at events such as these.70 Finally, the Court held that when the
State takes affirmative action to sponsor specific religious practices (like it
did in Santa Fe), it is violative of the Establishment Clause.71
The Supreme Court’s rulings regarding prayer in public schools favors
the ruling by the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.72
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld limitations that the Establishment Clause imposes on government.73 However, this has led the Court to
offer more protection for an individual’s right to not be coerced into supporting religion or its exercise and less protection of an individual’s right to
exercise that religion. The Supreme Court has held that the litmus test for
violating the Establishment Clause is whether an objective observer would
perceive one’s religious expression to be a “State endorsement of prayer in
public schools.”74 Kennedy’s right to freedom of speech under the First
Amendment was limited because an objective observer would not view his
prayer on the fifty-yard line as a state endorsement of prayer and religion.75
In his appellate brief, Kennedy argued that no other federal court had
taken such an extreme view of the Establishment Clause.76 He surely will
not be the only public employee affected by this expansive ruling. Kennedy
argued in his brief to the Ninth Circuit: “[t]he district court’s holding would
convert any religious expression, however fleeting—silently praying over
lunch in the cafeteria, making the sign of the cross, wearing a yarmulke or
headscarf—into an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion.”77 In
regard to the exercise of their religion in the workplace, public employees
should be offered more First Amendment protection.

70. Id. at 312.
71. Id. at 313.
72. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
73. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
74. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308.
75. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
76. Brief of Appellant at 15, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (2017)
(No. 16-35801), 2016 WL 6611220, at *15.
77. Id.

2019]

III.
A.

KENNEDY V. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

47

ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT CASE LAW
REGARDING PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOL

RELEVANT CASE SUMMARIES

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is not the first appellate court that
was faced with the task of interpreting what level of First Amendment protection the Constitution guarantees for public school coaches.78 However,
the Ninth Circuit was the first federal court to apply such an expansive
reading of the Establishment Clause in the context of a public-school coach
practicing his freedom of religion rights under the First Amendment.79
While two other cases, one out of the Fifth Circuit80 and one out of the
Third Circuit,81 had holdings similar to Kennedy, these cases did not go as
far as Kennedy.
In Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a public-school coach was not allowed to sponsor prayers at the end of games and at practices.82 Coach Smith coached
girls’ basketball at a junior high school in the Duncanville Independent
School District.83 She typically led the team in the recitation of the Lord’s
Prayer at the beginning or end of practice.84 Eventually, the Lord’s Prayer
was recited at center court at the end of games. 85 Coaches would stand over
the girls with their heads bowed.86 Jane Doe, a twelve-year-old girl on
Coach Smith’s basketball team, “participated out of a desire not to create
dissension.”87 She told her father that she preferred not to participate in the
prayers.88 Jane and her father filed a complaint against the school district
alleging that the school’s practice of allowing the coach to lead the team in
prayers at practice and at the end of games violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.89
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Lee v. Weisman90 when it
decided that Coach Smith violated the Establishment Clause because her
78. See generally Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d
Cir. 2008); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
79. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
80. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160.
81. Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
82. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d at 160.
83. Id. at 161.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d at 160.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992).
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involvement “[would] be perceived by the students as inducing a participation they might otherwise reject.”91 The court held that because Coach
Smith led the students in the recitation of the prayer and stood over them
with her head bowed while they recited the prayer at the end of games, she
“just as surely chose and ‘composed’ the prayer here as did the school officials in Lee.”92
In Borden v. School District of the Township of East Brunswick, the
court held that a high school football coach was in violation of the Establishment Clause when he bowed his head and took a knee while his team
engaged in prayer.93 The court also held that the coach was not addressing a
matter of public concern.94 East Brunswick School District had a policy that
prohibited faculty from participating in student-initiated prayer.95 Marcus
Borden, the head football coach at East Brunswick High School, brought
suit on the grounds that the policy was unconstitutional because it violated
his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.96 Borden wanted
to engage in the practice of bowing his head during his team’s pre-game
meal prayers and he also wanted to take a knee with his team during their
locker room prayers.97
Borden argued that the school district’s policy prohibiting him from
participating in student-initiated prayer infringed on his right to freedom of
speech.98 In response, the court held that Borden’s conduct was not a matter
of public concern and, thus, his conduct did not invoke the protection of his
right, as a public employee, to freedom of speech.99 Further, the court held
that Borden’s conduct of engaging in the practice of bowing his head and
taking a knee with his team during student-initiated prayer violated the Establishment Clause.100 In making its decision, the court relied on the fact
that the two activities at which the student prayers were taking place (the
locker room preparations and the pre-game meals) were school-sponsored
events.101 The court found that Borden’s involvement in the prayers was as
a leader, organizer, and a participant; therefore, an objective observer
would assume that Borden’s actions constituted an endorsement of religion.102
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d at 165 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. 577).
Id.
Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 178.
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ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON TO THE KENNEDY CASE

The Doe case is similar to the Kennedy case, but the Ninth Circuit in
Kennedy interpreted the Establishment Clause too broadly such that it eviscerates First Amendment protection for public employees.103 In Doe v.
Duncanville Independent School District, Coach Smith was leading her
team in the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at the end of games and at practice.104 This outright endorsement of religion105 is different than Kennedy’s
practice of engaging in silent prayer on the fifty-yard line after games.106 In
Doe, Coach Smith led the students in the prayer or stood over them while
they bowed their heads and engaged in religious practices.107 The court
found that it was an endorsement as if she had chosen and composed the
prayer herself.108
Using the Establishment Clause to keep a public-school coach from
engaging in silent prayer on the fifty-yard line, like the Ninth Circuit did in
the Kennedy case,109 means a court would have to interpret the Clause much
more broadly than the court did in Doe.110 Unlike the Doe case, where the
court considered the coach’s religious conduct an endorsement because she
led the students in prayer and stood over them while they engaged in the
religious practice,111 a silent prayer on the fifty-yard line after a game has
ended is not religious conduct to the same degree because it does not involve students. As long as public employees like Kennedy112 refrain from
leading their students in prayer, they should be able to silently practice their
religion without it being considered an endorsement by the school district.
The Kennedy Court also interpreted the Establishment Clause more
broadly than the court in Borden.113 Borden’s involvement in the pre-game
meal prayers and the locker room prayers114 was different than Kennedy’s
conduct of engaging in a silent prayer on the fifty-yard line after football
games.115 The two reasons that the court in Borden ruled his conduct was an
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d 813.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160.
Id.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160.
Id.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d 813.
Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
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endorsement of religion were: (1) that Borden was involved in studentinitiated prayer as a leader, organizer, and participant, and (2) that the pregame meal prayers and the locker room prayers were school sponsored
events.116 Kennedy’s conduct is different than Borden’s conduct because
Borden participated in student-initiated prayer,117 and Kennedy engaged in
a silent prayer for his individual purpose.118 Further, the court in Borden
held that Borden’s involvement was as a leader, organizer, and participant,119 and Kennedy’s conduct of engaging in a silent prayer on the fiftyyard line involves no leadership over students.120
One might argue that the Borden case and the Kennedy case are similar because they both involve coaches engaging in religious conduct at
school sponsored events.121 However, as discussed further in the hereinafter
set forth balancing test, the nature of the school sponsored event is important to consider.122 While the activities in Borden and Kennedy are both
school sponsored, the activities in Borden involve much more coercion than
did Kennedy’s.123 Borden engaged in religious conduct at an event that is at
the core of his players’ experience as student athletes because even if the
student athletes are not required to be at events like locker-room gatherings
or pre-game meals, those activities are social conventions that the students
should feel welcome to participate in without being subjected to proselytizing religious conduct that is potentially offensive to them.124
While a football game is indeed a social convention entangled in a
student’s school experience,125 Kennedy engaged in religious conduct by
himself, silently, after the game was over.126 The occasion of silently praying by oneself is not a social convention, much less a social convention that
a student should reasonably expect to be free to participate in without being
subject to witnessing religious conduct that is offensive to them.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
Id.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
Id.; Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813; Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
Borden, 523 F.3d 153.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
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IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE OFFERED MORE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION THROUGH A BALANCING TEST
The direction that the Supreme Court is heading suggests that Kennedy is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his retaliation claim. 127 However,
the Supreme Court should ensure that First Amendment protection is mandated for public employees and, specifically, for Kennedy. Kennedy takes
the Establishment Clause too far, at the expense of public employees. By
upholding Kennedy, the Supreme Court will grant an impermissible infringement on public employees’ practice of their religion.128
Kennedy limits free speech much more than what the Constitution
mandates. The practical impact of this decision is that public employees
will be severely limited in how, when, and where they practice their religion. Without some type of restriction on the ability of the Establishment
Clause to favor the rights of public school students at the expense of public
employees, the court is essentially ruling that, at least while public employees are clothed with state authority, the State may properly impose a nonreligious neutral system of belief. The main contention in the overall analysis of this case is whether a public employee’s actions regarding the practice of their religion will unduly influence a student by endorsing religion.129
This Note argues that through its restriction on religious activity, instead of permitting the reasonable exercise of one’s chosen religion, the
State is doing just what the court’s interpretation of the Establishment
Clause has sought to prevent. The court seeks to protect the students from
school officials who endorse a certain belief system,130 but by limiting, if
not eliminating, religious beliefs, the court is engaging in the type of activity it wants to preclude from happening.
Instead of the outright denial of any sort of religious expression while
one is exercising his duties as a public official, there should be a balancing
test that reasonably considers the rights of the student to protection from a
public official’s endorsement of religion and the rights of the public official
to freely practice his religion. The Ninth Circuit swings the balance too far
in favor of the student and this is to the detriment of public officials. The
Supreme Court should seize the opportunity to offer greater protection for
public officials, and, in particular, for Kennedy.
127. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290; Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
128. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
129. See id.
130. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit oversimplifies the concerns at issue in the Kennedy
case. The court failed to consider the practical effects that its ruling would
have on public employees of various religious backgrounds, as outlined in
the analysis of the practical impact section located below.131 The court
treated the right of public employees to First Amendment protection regarding their religious freedoms and the right of students to not be encouraged
or coerced to engage in religious practices to be mutually exclusive.132 In all
practicality, the protections of the Constitution are not so black and white.
There needs to be room for public employees to engage in the practice of
their religion, even while acting in their public employee capacity.133 Thus,
the following balancing test is suggested:
A.

BALANCING TEST FACTOR ONE: THE NATURE OF THE ACTION

The first factor that should be considered by the Court is the nature of
the action by the public employee. In each of the four landmark religious
freedom cases discussed above, the Court considered the nature of the occasion at which one’s exercise of their religion was at issue.134 The Religion
Clause of the First Amendment provides that the government cannot make
any law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.135 But this religious liberty is limited when the State “affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”136
In Lee, the Court looked to the nature of the event where the exercise
of religious practice was taking place.137 The Court considered the student’s
desire to be a part of the experience.138 Further, the Court stressed the idea
that “adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social conven131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
134. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) (holding that the
nature of a high school football game provides that it is an event where students should not
have to choose “between attending these games and avoiding personally offensive religious
rituals”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that the nature of a graduation
ceremony provides that it is an event for which students have a strong incentive to attend);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that the nature of a daily period of silence
for meditation or voluntary prayer is a practice that is not consistent with the principle that
government should remain neutral toward religion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(holding that the nature of the use of the public school system to encourage the recitation of
prayer is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause).
135. Lambs Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395
(1993).
136. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 313.
137. Lee, 505 U.S at 593.
138. Id.
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tion.”139 In Lee, the social convention at issue was a high school graduation
ceremony.140 In Santa Fe, the social convention was a high school football
game.141 The principle behind this notion is that students should not have to
choose between attending these social conventions and subjecting themselves to religious conduct that is offensive to them.142 In Santa Fe, the
Court found that the delivery of a prayer to those present before the start of
the high school football game coerces those present to engage in an act of
religious worship.143
The exercise of religious conduct by a public official or endorsed by a
public official at a social convention of the nature described above should
be held unconstitutional. The nature of the social conventions described
above are critically entangled in the student experience such that students
should be offered considerable protection from the infringement of their
rights under the Establishment Clause.144 However, when the nature of the
social convention is much less involved in the student experience, public
officials should be afforded greater protection in the exercise of their religious practices.
The Kennedy case provides a valuable opportunity for the Court to
outline the varying degrees to which religious conduct by public officials
may influence students. In Kennedy, one might argue that the nature of the
social convention is a high school football game, like in the Santa Fe
case.145 However, unlike Santa Fe, where the students at the game were
involuntarily subjected to listening to a prayer before the start of the
game,146 students at Bremerton High School were not involuntarily coerced
to listen to Kennedy’s prayers on the fifty-yard line for merely attending or
participating in the high school football game. 147 Merely taking a knee on
the fifty-yard line after a football game has ended and engaging in silent
prayer is unlikely to coerce any students participating in or present at the
game to engage in that same religious activity. The social convention has
been terminated at that point. The coach is no longer teaching or coaching.
He has shed his indicia of state sponsored authority. What if he prayed in
the parking lot when he arrived at his car to leave the premises? What if he
prayed when all of the students had left the field and the stands? These examples all stand for the proposition that state authority had concluded.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290.
See id.
Id. at 312.
See Lee, 505 U.S at 593.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290.
Id.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
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In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit held that “[p]ractically speaking, Kennedy’s job as a football coach was also akin to being a teacher.”148 The
court is correct. This situation is comparable to a schoolteacher engaging in
silent prayer before a meal where she is acting as a lunch monitor. Like a
football coach, she is an on-duty, public official who is engaging in religious conduct. However, the nature of Kennedy’s religious conduct is not
such that a reasonable student should feel coerced to join in the religious
exercise.
The Supreme Court should find that the rule from the Wallace case is
applicable to this case. However, while the bright-line rule from Wallace v.
Jaffree is precedent and could be relied upon by the Court in its analysis of
the Kennedy case,149 relying on that case in deciding the Kennedy case
would severely limit the right to freedom of speech for public employees.
The bright-line rule from Wallace is that if the State’s purpose is to endorse
religion, then the State’s actions violate the Establishment Clause.150 Applying this rule to the Kennedy case would take the Wallace decision too far. In
Wallace, the State enacted a statute that was motivated by a non-secular
purpose,151 while in Kennedy, there was no statute involved.152 In Kennedy,
the action was after the social convention was terminated.153
Instead of using the reasoning from the Wallace case,154 the Court
should use the analysis from Lee v. Weisman155 to offer more protection to
Kennedy and other public officials. In Lee, the court looked to the degree of
school involvement in deciding whether or not there was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.156 The Lee decision used an analysis based on the
degree of involvement; this supports the idea that a balancing test would be
appropriate in the Kennedy case and others like it because analysis based on
degree is essentially a balancing test.157
Further, in considering the nature of the action by the public employee,
it is helpful to look to whether or not there is a captive audience, such as
there would be in a classroom or at a graduation ceremony.158 In the Supreme Court cases outlined above regarding First Amendment free speech
rights, there were always captive audiences that were being subjected to
148. Id. at 826.
149. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
150. Id. at 57.
151. Id. at 56.
152. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Brief of Appellant at 15, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-35801), 2016 WL 6611220, at *15.

2019]

KENNEDY V. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

55

religious endorsement by a public official.159 In Kennedy, the students were
not subjected to the endorsement of the religious conduct because they were
not a captive audience.160 Rather, Kennedy was simply engaging in a brief,
fifteen to twenty second silent prayer on the fifty-yard line after a game was
concluded and after his state sponsored duties were over.161 Kennedy’s
conduct was not meant for a captive audience such that the students were
forced to watch or take part in the religious conduct with him.162 It is hardly
the case that a reasonable student observer would view Kennedy’s action
“as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.”163
It would be reasonable for the Court to develop a balancing test involving an analysis of the nature of the social convention as outlined above,
because it allows for the protection of students from being coerced to engage in religious activity in situations where they reasonably should expect
not to be coerced. However, this part of the balancing test also leaves room
for the Court to establish certain protections for public officials where their
actions are of such little influence on students, that the practical effect of
the prohibition of certain religious conduct would unreasonably infringe on
the public officials’ rights to freedom of speech.
B.

BALANCING TEST FACTOR TWO: INDIVIDUAL PURPOSE V. INTENT TO
COERCE

The second factor that should be considered by the Court is whether
the public official is participating in religious conduct merely for their sole
satisfaction or whether they are participating with an intent to coerce students to engage in religious conduct as well. In Santa Fe, the Court made
clear that the purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “is to
secure religious liberty.”164 It held that religious liberty is protected unless
the state “affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of pray-

159. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that students were subjected to religious endorsement by a public official at a high school football
game); Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (holding that students were subjected to endorsement by a public
official at a graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that
students were subjected to endorsement by a public official in a classroom setting); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that students were subjected to endorsement by a public official in a classroom setting where the expression was conveyed over a loud speaker).
160. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308.
164. Id. (citing Engel, 370 U.S. 421).
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er.”165 The Court has held that the State affirmatively sponsors certain religious practices in each of the landmark cases discussed above.166
In Engel v. Vitale, the Court held that the State affirmatively sponsors
a religious practice if the State establishes a law requiring the recitation of a
certain prayer at the start of the school day.167 In Wallace v. Jaffree, the
Court held that the State affirmatively sponsors a religious practice if the
State authorizes a period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer.168 In
Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that the State affirmatively sponsors a religious practice when the State invites an individual to offer prayers at a
graduation ceremony.169 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
the Court held that the State affirmatively sponsors a religious practice
when the State participates in the selection of a student speaker to engage in
prayer at high school football games.170
In each of these cases, it is clear that the State made an affirmative decision to coerce students to participate in the religious practice.171 The State,
acting through public officials, should have come to the reasonable conclusion that the students involved would see their actions as an endorsement of
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. None of these cases involved a public official merely engaging in religious conduct for his sole
satisfaction, but rather, they went much further than that.172 There must be a
legal analysis outlined by the Court that considers the intent of the public
official involved in the religious conduct at issue. There is simply too much
of a distinction between State sponsored prayer, for example, and a public
official engaging in a silent prayer for the sake of honoring God.
In Wallace, the Court held that one of the relevant questions regarding
State participation in religious conduct is “whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.”173
A reasonable observer, who might witness Kennedy take a knee and engage
in silent prayer on the fifty-yard line after games, would arguably perceive
Kennedy’s conduct as carrying out his personal religious beliefs. However,
it is unlikely that a reasonable person would believe that Kennedy’s actions
are attributable to the school district by which he is employed, just as it is
165. Id. at 313.
166. See id. at 290; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
167. Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
168. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41.
169. Lee, 505 U.S. 577.
170. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 306.
171. See id. at 290; Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Wallace, 472 U.S. 38; Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
172. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290.
173. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 73, 76.
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unlikely that a reasonable person would believe that a schoolteacher’s silent
prayer before her school lunch is in any way reflective of the school district’s endorsement of religion.
In the Santa Fe case, the Court found that “members of the listening
audience must perceive the pregame message as a public expression of the
views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the
school administration.”174 In regard to the Kennedy case, if one considers
only Kennedy’s exercise of a silent prayer on the fifty-yard line following
games, one can conclude that Kennedy’s actions, though they were surely
noticed by others, were isolated from others such that they were not forced
to participate or engage in the conduct with him in any way. 175 In the Kennedy case, though he is a public official, an objective observer would arguably assume that he was practicing his religion for his sole satisfaction,
without an intent to coerce others to engage in his practice as well.176
An objective observer would not believe that the school has endorsed
its approval merely because Kennedy is praying after a game. In the Santa
Fe case, the Court found that there was affirmative action by the State because the school participated in the practice of religious conduct by offering
students an opportunity to elect a certain student to lead the school in prayer
before football games.177 In the Kennedy case, there was not approval, support, or endorsement of Kennedy’s conduct.178
The isolated actions of one public official is hardly an endorsement or
an attempt to coerce others to engage in religious conduct. Whether the
religious action can be observed by students or not is irrelevant, as long as
the public official engaging in the religious conduct in no way involves or
attempts to involve the students. However, as the religious conduct being
engaged in by public officials begins to involve students, the balance starts
to shift.
When Kennedy engaged in silent prayer on the fifty-yard line immediately following games, his conduct was indeed observable to students at
Bremerton School District, as well as their parents, and others who attended
the game.179 This conduct, in its own right, did not in any way involve the
students.180 The Ninth Circuit based part of its reasoning on the idea that
part of Kennedy’s job description was “to be a coach, mentor and role model for the student athletes.”181 They found that his job involved “modeling
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 825.
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good behavior while acting in an official capacity in the presence of students and spectators.”182
The Ninth Circuit held that because Kennedy’s religious conduct took
place while he was working in his official capacity as a public official and
in the presence of students, his conduct was an endorsement by the State of
its religious beliefs.183 This reasoning and analysis by the Ninth Circuit is
simply not applicable in Kennedy. In regard to his role as a mentor and role
model for the students,184 whether Kennedy is working in his official capacity or not has no practical effect whatsoever on the students when it is done
outside the social convention.
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit addresses the fact that Kennedy
acknowledged that as a football coach, he was “constantly being observed
by others.”185 The Ninth Circuit even went so far as to say that, Kennedy’s
“media appearances and prayer in the BHS bleachers (while wearing BHS
apparel and surrounded by others) signal his intent to send a message to
students and parents about appropriate behavior and what he values as a
coach.”186 By acknowledging that Kennedy is being constantly observed by
others and that Kennedy conveys his values to students who witness his
religious conduct, even when he is not acting in his role as a public official,
the Ninth Circuit essentially voids the distinction that it is trying to create.
Ultimately, the outcome of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District was
decided in favor of the school district because Kennedy was acting as a
public employee when he prayed on the fifty-yard line immediately after
football games such that his conduct was an endorsement of religion to the
students.187 But the Ninth Circuit also says that Kennedy’s conduct conveys
his values to his students even when he is not acting in his official capacity
as a public official.188 Kennedy’s practice of engaging in silent prayer on
the football field immediately following games has no greater effect on his
students than when they see him engage in prayer at any other public establishment.
V.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE KENNEDY DECISION IN
LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED BALANCING TEST

In his brief to the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy sheds some light on what the
practical impact of its holding will likely be: “[t]he district court’s holding
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 826.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 826.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 822.
See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 826.
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would convert any religious expression, however fleeting – silently praying
over lunch in the cafeteria, making the sign of the cross, wearing a yarmulke or headscarf – into an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion.”189
And while the prevailing law regarding prayer in public schools190 “belies
any notion that these may trump schoolchildren’s Establishment Clause
rights,”191 the Court has also held that “public employees do not surrender
all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”192
Throughout his time as a coach at Bremerton High School, Kennedy
engaged in varying degrees of religious conduct.193 For a time, prior to most
games, Kennedy would lead players and coaches in a locker-room prayer.194
He would participate in locker-room prayers after the games as well.195
Kennedy would also pray a brief, thirty-second prayer on the fifty-yard line
at the end of most games.196 At first, Kennedy performed his post-game
fifty-yard line prayers alone.197 But part way through his first season, some
of Kennedy’s players asked him if they could join in the conduct.198 He told
them that they could do whatever they wanted because it was a free country.199 Kennedy’s post-game fifty-yard line prayers eventually turned into
short motivational speeches that contained religious content and prayers.200
Students, coaches, and people in attendance at the game were invited to
attend Kennedy’s post-game speeches.201
The practical impact of the Kennedy decision is that public officials
will not be able to practice their religion while they are on the job.202 The
court took issue with Kennedy’s silent, fifty-yard line prayers – although
that conduct was hardly to the same degree of endorsing religion as was his
other religious conduct (such as his locker room prayers and post-game
speeches) and arguably is not violative of the Constitution.203
189. Brief of Appellant at 15, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-35801), 2016 WL 6611220, at *15.
190. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
191. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1993).
192. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).
193. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 816.
198. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 816.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 813.
203. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
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Under the test that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated, any
of the religious conduct that Kennedy engaged in, as referenced above,
would be considered an endorsement and thus would not be protected by
the First Amendment.204 Alternatively, under the balancing test proposed in
this Note, some of Kennedy’s conduct would be protected while other conduct would still be considered an endorsement of religion.205 Under the
balancing test proposed in this Note, a court would likely find that Kennedy’s conduct of engaging in a silent prayer on the fifty-yard line after a
football game is conduct that is protected by the First Amendment because
the social convention was severed, just like a court would likely find that a
schoolteacher engaging in a silent prayer before a meal where she is acting
as a lunch monitor is conduct protected by the First Amendment.206 The
practical impact of this proposed balancing test, in contrast to the ruling in
Kennedy,207 is that there would still be some First Amendment protection
for public officials to engage in religious conduct, while still offering substantial protection for students. This test would allow the Court to ensure
that “public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by
reason of their employment,”208 while still protecting students’ rights under
the Establishment Clause.209
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District
allows for an untethered restriction on a public officials’ First Amendment
right to free speech. The current Supreme Court case law might favor the
ruling by the Ninth Circuit,210 but the practical implications of this holding
should give the Court pause. The practical implications of the ruling by the
Ninth Circuit show that the trajectory of the current Supreme Court case
law regarding the protection of the free speech rights of public employees
versus the protection of students under the Establishment Clause needs to
be reconsidered. The Kennedy decision is yet another example of how current circuits (like the Third and Fifth Circuits discussed above)211 are effec-

204. Id.
205. See discussion supra Section IV.
206. See discussion supra Section IV.
207. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
208. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).
209. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
210. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
211. See discussion supra Section III.
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tuating current Supreme Court decisions in such a way that severely limits
the protection of public officials’ rights to free speech.212
Kennedy holds public employees cannot engage in religious activity
while acting in their public capacity. That is not practical because it offers
almost no protection for public employees.213 The balancing test outlined
above would enable a court to weigh the extent and degree to which a public official’s religious activity violates the Establishment Clause, while also
giving effect to a public official’s right to practice his religion. First, the
Court should look to the nature of the action by the public employee. 214
Second, the Court should consider whether the public official is participating in religious conduct for his sole satisfaction or whether he is participating with intent to coerce students, either explicitly or implicitly to engage in
religious conduct as well.215
Prevailing law needs to be reconsidered in an attempt to find a more
equitable balance between the rights of public officials to their freedom of
speech and the rights of students under the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has a valuable opportunity, through the Kennedy case, to offer
more protections to public officials, because Kennedy engaged in religious
conduct at such varying degrees.216 By hearing this case, the Court would
be able to consider the various degrees of religious conduct that might be
engaged in by public officials such that they might create a balancing test
that affords public officials the opportunity to practice their beliefs without
using their position to impermissibly establish a religious environment in a
public school setting.
POST-SCRIPT
Since the composition of this Note in January 2018, Kennedy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari based on his claim that
Bremerton School District violated his right to freedom of speech by prohibiting him from praying silently on the fifty-yard line after football
games.217 The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.218
In his statement respecting the denial of certiorari, Justice Alito, with whom
Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh joined, stated that
the Court’s denial of certiorari does not necessarily mean that the Court

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
Id.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019).
Id.
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agrees with the Kennedy decision as it stands.219 Justice Alito stated “important unresolved factual questions would make it very difficult if not impossible at this stage to decide the free speech question that the petition
asks us to review.”220 Important factual questions are unresolved because
the District Court failed to make any clear finding about whether Kennedy
would be able to prove that the termination of his employment violated his
free speech rights.221 The district court did not make a clear finding about
the basis of the school district’s termination of Kennedy’s employment,
more specifically, whether the school district justified his termination because he neglected his duties as a football coach or because he engaged in
prayer-related activities.222 Justice Alito stated that instead, the court
“melded the two distinct justifications” by failing to make specific factual
findings supporting the existence of either justification.223 Justice Alito stated that the Ninth Circuit muddled the record even more because not only
did it fail to identify a clear justification for Kennedy’s loss of employment,
it also enumerated Kennedy’s past prayer-related activities.224
Justice Alito stated, “the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of free speech
rights of public school teachers is troubling and may justify review in the
future” and “[i]f the Ninth Circuit continues to apply its interpretation of
Garcetti in future cases involving school teachers or coaches, review by this
Court may be appropriate.”225 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court held that a
deputy district attorney’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment
when he wrote a memorandum in which he recommended dismissal of a §
1983 case brought against the district attorney’s office.226 Attorney Ceballos recommended dismissal based on purported governmental misconduct, and Ceballos’ employment was subsequently terminated.227 Ceballos
alleged that his employment should not have been terminated because he
was engaging in protected speech.228 The Court held his speech was not
protected because he was making a statement pursuant to his official duties
and was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.229 In his
statement regarding the denial of certiorari in the Kennedy case, Justice
Alito said that the Court has never applied such an expansive reading of the
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
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Garcetti case and he admonished the Ninth Circuit that applying its expansive reading of Garcetti to future cases may invite review by the Court.230
The Court’s admonishment to the Court of Appeals raises an interesting question: is the Court ready to weigh in on a case of this type? If the
lower courts had made a factual finding that Kennedy had been terminated
because of his exercise of religion, it is likely that the Supreme Court would
have granted certiorari. The Court clearly stated that the Court of Appeals
misread and misapplied its ruling in Garcetti,231 and, therefore, one could
infer that it would have granted certiorari but for the procedural defects
created
by
the
lower
courts.
The balancing test proposed in this Note is an appropriate Constitutional
methodology for the Court to consider. It is unlikely that the Court would
impose a proverbial bright line test because of the subjective nature of the
issue considered in cases like Kennedy232 and Garcetti;233 the balancing test
proposed in this Note would provide an appropriate Constitutional analysis.
Public employees are not reposed with state authority on a continuous
basis. High school students are empowered to decide whether they want to
participate in certain activities, including whether they want to participate
in those activities mentally or physically; students make these decisions
every school day. With respect to a coach’s exercise of religion, the Ninth
Circuit seems to believe that the coach becomes clothed with powers that
yield results that are against a student’s will. The parochialism of the lower
courts’ reasoning and conclusion is unfortunate and not grounded in reality.
A coach is not establishing or advocating for a state sponsored religion
merely because he engages in silent prayer at the fifty-yard line by himself
after football games. The Supreme Court seems to intimate that it agrees.

230.
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